A Secure Scheme for Group Communication of Wireless IoT Devices by Alohali, Bashar et al.
This is a repository copy of A Secure Scheme for Group Communication of Wireless IoT 
Devices.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/141752/
Version: Accepted Version
Conference or Workshop Item:
Alohali, Bashar, Vasilakis, Vasileios orcid.org/0000-0003-4902-8226, Moscholios, Ioannis 
et al. (1 more author) (2018) A Secure Scheme for Group Communication of Wireless IoT 
Devices. In: 2018 11th International Symposium on Communication Systems, Networks & 
Digital Signal Processing (CSNDSP), 18-20 Jul 2018. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
A Secure Scheme for Group Communication
of Wireless IoT Devices
Bashar A. Alohali∗, Vassilios G. Vassilakis†, Ioannis D. Moscholios‡, Michael D. Logothetis§
∗School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, United Kingdom
†Dept. of Computer Science, University of York, York, United Kingdom
‡Dept. of Informatics & Telecommunications, University of Peloponnese, Tripolis, Greece
§Dept. of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Patras, Patras, Greece
Abstract—The emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT)
is expected to significantly advance the technology develop-
ment in many application domains such as agriculture, home
automation, and healthcare. However, in the IoT era, this
development faces serious research challenges in terms of
handling large amounts of data, designing efficient system
architectures, and implementing appropriate mechanisms
for privacy and security assurance. Especially the network
security aspect of the IoT is of major importance due to huge
amounts of data that the IoT is expected to generate and
handle, and considering the limited resources of typical IoT
devices. One of the serious security threats are the physical
attacks on the IoT devices that operate in remote locations.
These are known in the literature as the node capture attacks.
Motivated by the aforementioned issues, this paper first
introduces the background of IoT security and discusses
the related challenges. Next, a secure group communication
scheme that enables IoT using low energy wireless IP
network is described. The proposed approach is based on
Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme, which has been enhanced
to enable secure group-to-group communication of resource-
constrained IoT devices. In particular, we consider the low
energy wireless IP networking technology as one of the IoT
enablers and the problem of mitigating the negative effects
of node capture attacks on IoT devices. Simulation results
show significant improvements of the proposed scheme over
the traditional public-key based approach.
Keywords—Internet of Things; group communication; se-
cret sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Internet of Things (IoT) has attracted
attention due to its impact in a wide range of application
areas, including agriculture, smart grids, industrial con-
trol systems, remote healthcare, smart mobility, and road
traffic management [1]–[3]. IoT is expected to grow both
in terms of its deployment size as well as its expansion
to new application areas. The term IoT was coined by
Kevin Ashton in 1999 and refers to the connectivity of
any entity (also known as “thing”), that has an embedded
microprocessor chip, is globally addressable, using, e.g.,
an IP address, and is connected to a wired or wireless
network [4]. This leads to a smart world with ubiquitous
computing and provides services that enable remote access
and intelligent functionality [5].
IoT enables real-time analysis of data flows that im-
proves the efficiency and reliability of communication
systems. For example, connecting all appliances in a smart
home can save electricity by efficient monitoring. IoT
provides convenience in day-to-day living and makes an
intelligent use of resources in a home [6]. Connected
devices ranging from sensors to automated transport, will
generate huge volumes of data that should be effectively
managed and processed.
We recognize the fact that all references to IoT typ-
ically involve sensors with different levels of integration
to smart devices and the use of heterogeneous networking
technologies. Hence, from this perspective, a security
scheme concerns the operational and functional aspects of
these sensor motes. We use the term IoT to signify such
networked devices with sensing elements. Hence, in this
paper, we use the term IoT rather than the term Wireless
Sensor Network (WSN).
There are large-scale deployments of IoT in infrastruc-
ture networks such as water management systems, smart
grids, and logistics management. The security risk for an
infrastructure that provides such services, termed as crit-
ical infrastructure, is important. Recent cyber-attacks on
critical infrastructure have highlighted the drastic effects
on people’s lifes and sometimes even in a nationwide scale
[7]. The need for a secure and resilient infrastructure and
services is evident. In this paper, we identify the most
important security threats and requirements for the IoT.
We then describe the specific scenario in which we intend
to propose a solution. Our proposed scheme is based on
Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme [8]. The latter has been
enhanced to enable secure group-to-group communication
of wireless IoT devices and to mitigate the negative effects
of node capture attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the basic IoT architectural elements.
In Section III, we discuss a number of representative IoT
applications. In Section IV, we identify the most important
IoT security challenges. In Section V, we discuss the
IoT security risks and secure design requirements. In
Section VI, we propose a new secure scheme for the
group communication of wireless IoT devices. In Section
VII, we present a high-level security analysis, focusing on
node capture attacks and replay attacks. In Section VIII,
we evaluate our proposed scheme by means of computer
simulations, by comparing it with the traditional public-
key based approach. We conclude and discuss our future
work in Section IX.
II. IOT ARCHITECTURAL ELEMENTS
This section presents the main elements of a typical
IoT architecture. They are mentioned using a high level
taxonomy to help in identifying and defining the compo-
nents required by the IoT. The three IoT components that
can enable intelligent and ubiquitous computing are [9]:
1) Hardware: Includes the embedded processing
and communication hardware, sensors and ac-
tuators.
2) Middleware: Is responsible for on-demand stor-
age as well as the required computing tasks to
support data analytics.
3) Visualization and analysis tools: Are user-
friendly and available on different platforms and
for different applications.
In the following, we briefly discuss the most important
enabling technological developments that implement the
three components indicated above. First of all, the Ra-
dio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology enables
the microchips for wireless data communication [10].
RFID has the capability to automatically identify anything
within a given range and acts as an electronic barcode.
RFID inactive tags are not powered with the use of
battery; instead, they utilize the reader’s interrogation
signal power to communicate with the RFID reader. This
has resulted in a wide range of interesting applications,
especially in the retail and supply-chain management
sector. An example that can be given to explain this
concept is its applicability in Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS), such as the registration stickers or the
replacement of tickets. On the other hand, the RFID active
tags are powered from their own battery and are able
to instantiate the communication. A few examples from
applications using RFID active tags are those in port
containers that are responsible to monitor cargo [11].
Another important IoT enabler is the WSN technol-
ogy [12]–[14]. This refers to cost-effective, efficient, and
low power miniature electronic apparatuses for usage in
remote sensing applications. WSNs have significantly in-
creased the capability of utilizing a sensor network which
currently consists of a large number of intelligent sensors
and can collect, process and analyze the distribution of
valuable data and information that are gathered in a variety
of environments. However, the technical challenges that
must be addressed in order to exploit better the huge
potential of WSNs, are multidisciplinary and substantial
in nature. To be more specific, the data of the sensor are
shared between sensor nodes and are thereafter sent to a
centralized (or distributed) system for analysis.
III. IOT APPLICATIONS
IoT applications can be classified based on the network
availability type, heterogeneity, repeatability coverage,
scale, user involvement, and impact. Thus, various IoT
applications can be broadly categorized into four appli-
cation domains [15]: i) personal and home, ii) enterprise,
iii) utilities, and iv) mobile.
An IoT application of the first category (personal and
home) utilizes the information gathered by the sensor,
that is only used by those who own the network. For
example, nowadays it is possible for a smartphone using
an iOS, Android or Windows Phone operating system
to communicate via multiple interfaces (e.g., Bluetooth,
WiFi) for interconnecting sensors that measure physio-
logical parameters. Also, these types of IoT applications
allow the control of home equipment such as refrigerators
and air conditioners, enabling a comfortable home and an
efficient energy management [16], [17].
The second category refers to an enterprise-based
application. It mainly relates with the businesses and deals
with the Network of Things (NoT) within a business
environment. The data and the information gathered by
these networks is selectively released and is only used by
their owners. For instance, a common application that can
describe this condition is the environmental monitoring
which was developed and implemented to keep track of
the number of residents within the building. This can
be achieved, for example, through a light sensor. As a
result, the sensors in this case represent a fundamental
component and used for automation, security, and climate
control reasons.
Another important category refers to the utility appli-
cations. Such applications are already used by several util-
ity organizations mainly for managing their resources and
optimizing, e.g., the electricity cost vs. profit. However,
such application requires the deployment and management
of expensive network infrastructure in order to be capable
enough to monitor critical utilities, hence achieving an
efficient and effective resource management. Usually, such
networks are used by large businesses (on a national
scale) that have the potential to afford costly satellite or
cellular communications [18]. Such an IoT application
can continuously monitor every electricity consumption
and generation point within a house and modify the
way electricity is consumed. Hence, it can be said that
this application is environmentally friendly as it achieves
efficient energy consumption [15].
IV. IOT SECURITY CHALLENGES
Providing appropriate levels of IoT security is an
extremely important yet a very challenging task. The IoT
infrastructure and devices are sensitive to a number of
potential vulnerabilities, attacks, and design challenges.
One important implication is that the data generated and
used in IoT is subject to user privacy and data integrity
attacks. Other issues include the IoT failure due to the
physical faults of devices or malicious intrusions. This
may be especially complicated in case the data managed
by IoT relates to a critical information impacting people’s
lives, such as energy, transportation, business or health.
Connected things are typically resource-limited de-
vices with small storage capacity and energy. This makes
them vulnerable to a number of potential attacks and risks.
As a result, sensitive IoT data may be blocked and ma-
nipulated, with severe financial and security implications.
Security of connected devices may be enhanced by the
security by design approach, in which all security and
privacy risks are addressed in a process of things’ design
and implementation. In order to improve things against
attacks, new security protocols, encryption methods and
algorithms must be developed taking into consideration
memory and computing limitations of connected devices
[19]. Security architecture of IoT should also address
the issue of fault tolerance, since device failures may
be quite common in an IoT system. Filtering bogus and
manipulated data and ensuring data identity are critical
tasks for a robust IoT security system.
Connected devices will generate great volumes of data
that should be transmitted, processed, managed and anal-
ysed. In a centralized IoT approach, data management is
primarily realized by cloud computing systems. Therefore,
the security of this data to a large extent depends on
security measures undertaken by cloud service providers.
Data security in cloud systems depends on the protection
of the virtualization process and relies on safe allocation
and reallocation of resources [20]. Interactions between
the Hypervisor and the Virtual Machines (VMs) must
be properly organized to prevent data exposure when
resources are reallocated from one VM to another. Such
a need arises due to a shared and distributed nature of
computer resources in a cloud architecture. Data security
may be also compromised by the malicious traffic going
from one VM to another. In order to mitigate this risk,
traffic monitoring and firewalls between VMs may be used
as effective counter-measures. Another useful technique
is the segregation and isolation of different VMs classes
from each other [21].
IoT security faces a number of challenges that orig-
inate from the features of embedded computer devices,
RFID, networking technologies, and machine-to-machine
(M2M) communication. IoT is susceptible to replay at-
tacks via the compromised communication or attacks
that directly target IoT devices. The latter refers to an
attacker’s ability of observing the network traffic and
resending the captured packets at a later time to obtain
access to unauthorized resources. According to a typical
method of realizing a replay attack, a malicious user
can eavesdrop on communications and resend old packets
again multiple times in order to waste system or device
resources [22].
V. IOT SECURITY RISKS AND SECURE DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS
We consider a scenario that involves a set of wireless
devices/nodes, which are equipped with sensing elements
and term them as things. These things are organized into
groups. Each group has a node that provides an interface
to connect to the rest of the network. This node, termed
as the gateway node (GW), is connected to other similar
gateway nodes in the network to form a path to an
upstream server. All things in the network communicate
with the server in order to deposit the data they generate.
Given this scenario, there are two basic security risks
to be considered. Firstly, the wireless communication
opens the risk of attackers eavesdropping on the traffic
in the network and using the traffic characteristics and
the traffic data to break into the network. Being able to
gather packet data, enables several typical attacks, such
as the replay attacks, the Sybil attacks, and the imperson-
ation attacks. This necessitates that all the communication
between the end points is completely private. The packet
in transit should not contain any data in a form that is
directly readable or easily decipherable. Secondly, there is
always a risk of physical capture or damage of the thing.
In the event of a physical capture, the attempt would be
to either manipulate the node to behave in a manner that
the attacker decides or to be able to access any secret
information that is stored in the thing and then to utilize
that information to launch attacks.
Based on the two aforementioned risks, we lay down
our security requirements:
1) All things in the network should be authenticated
when they join the network.
2) The gateways are allowed to forward data only
from things that have already been authenticated.
3) All communication between things and with the
server must be completely private.
Fig. 1. A hierarchical model for IoT security (simple example).
4) Secret information being stored in individual
things should be avoided when possible. If there
is need to have some secret information to stored
in a thing, this information must not be sufficient
to spoof the identity of the compromised thing
and authenticate it with the network using that
identity. This requirement, therefore, excludes
the use of schemes that use a shared secret that
is stored in the thing.
A simple example of our considered hierarchical
model for IoT security is shown in Fig. 1. Note that the
hierarchy in the nodes is topological and not necessarily
functional from the point of view of the applications. Also,
things may join or leave the network at any point in time.
Hence, the hierarchical dependencies are highly dynamic
and may change over time.
Our security design is driven by the requirements men-
tioned above. The basic design parameter, as is common
with all applications for things, is the resource efficiency.
Computing, storage, and energy are the typical resources
whose utilization has to be efficient. Shared secrets, both
static and dynamic, that are used by secure schemes
require being stored. These secrets, therefore, should
require minimum storage resources. Also, the computing
requirements of the security scheme should be at a level
that the energy consumption is below a predefined limit.
A centralized security scheme often requires shared
secrets to be stored on the end devices. Communication
within the group also requires shared secrets, causing the
number of shared secrets to increase. Such solutions are
not scalable since the amount of storage for secrets in-
creases with the number of things that are communicated
with. In addition to this, the stored secrets should be such
that by capturing the secrets of one member of a group, the
attacker is not able to take on the identity of the captured
member. Therefore, distributed secret sharing, where a key
is derived from multiple secrets from within the group,
should be considered. The objective is to ensure that the
capture of a member will minimally impact the group, the
rest of the network, and the provided services.
Finally, the secure scheme should ensure that the
communication requirements to implement security are
as minimal as possible, since communication utilizes
the on-board energy, which is limited. The volume of
communications for implementing security, that is, the
security communications overheads must be minimal.
VI. THE PROPOSED SECURE SCHEME
We observe that the network topology of Fig. 1 is
a tree with the server as a root. The server could play a
limited role in the secure scheme to ensure that the design
requirements are conformed to. The things (leaf nodes)
communicate within the group and with the gateway, when
there is a need to send data to the server. If the security
scheme is designed in a distributed way, it can be generic
enough to be used in a wide range of topologies, such
as a tree topology, a mesh topology and a partial mesh
(cluster-tree) topology.
In the following sub-sections, we illustrate the process
of key generation and group membership verification. We
also briefly discuss the processing and storage overhead.
A. Key generation
The server creates a random master key, KS. This key
will be used to generate new keys for each child (which
must be a gateway when the parent is a server) with ID
GWg (i.e., GW1 and GW2 in Fig. 1):
KGWg = F (KS||GWg) (1)
where F (·) is a secure one-way hash function and || is the
concatenation operator. The key KGWg is stored at the
corresponding GWg . The server does not need to store
a copy of this key, since it can be generated from the
KS when needed. Continuing with the example of Fig
1., a similar procedure is followed by GW1 and GW2.
We observe that GW1 has two child IoT devices D1,1
and D2,1 (the generic notation for IoT devices is: Dn,g
where n is the device number and g is the group number)
and one child gateway, GW3. Hence, GW1 will use its
master key KGW1 to generate keys for its child nodes:
KDn,g = F (KGWg||Dn,g) (2)
KGWg′ = F (KGWg||GWg) (3)
where g′ is the group of the child gateway. Similarly,GW3
will generate keys for its child nodes and so on. The keys
are stored at the corresponding child nodes. As mentioned
before, the parent nodes do not need to store the keys since
they can generate keys when required.
B. Group verification
In this subsection, we describe the process of verifica-
tion of an IoT device in a group controlled by a gateway.
This scheme is based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme
and its extensions [8], [23], and has been adapted to en-
able secure group communication of resource-constrained
wireless IoT devices. Verification is based on a distributed
key generation scheme, according to which, the secret
is split and distributed among the group members. In
particular, assume that the number of nodes in a group
is N . Then the secret is split into N parts, and each part
is distributed to each one of the N nodes. At least, K
parts out of N can be put together to recover the secret.
Any less than K parts cannot recover the secret.
Key generation and distribution
Consider a group g controlled by a gateway GWg . The
group members are denoted by Dn,g, n = 1, . . . , N . GWg
is responsible for group key generation and distribution.
It performs the following steps:
1) It selects two large prime numbers, p and q, so
that q divides p−1 and the finite field GF (q) is
a unique subgroup of GF (p).
2) It selects two random polynomials, f1(x) and
f2(x), with coefficients in GF (p) and with de-
grees K − 1, where K is the minimum number
of secret shares required to construct a key.
3) It generates two tokens, f1(xn) and f2(xn), for
each group member Dn,g .
4) It selects four random integers, wn,1, wn,2, dn,1,
and dn,2 in GF (q), where wn,1 6= wn,2, for each
Dn,g .
5) For each Dn,g , it selects gn that is a generator
of GF (q).
6) It generates the key KDn,g for each Dn,g ac-
cording to (4), below.
7) It sends wn,1, wn,2, dn,1, dn,2, and each gn,
H(KDn,g) to every Dn,g , where H(x) is a one-
way hash function.
KDn,g = g
(dn,1f1(wn,1)+dn,2f2(wn,2)) mod p
n (4)
Key reconstruction
When receiving a message from an IoT device, Dn,g ,
another IoT device, say Di,g(i 6= n), of the same group
g will try to validate the sender by reconstructing the
sender’s key, KDn,g . In particular, each Di,g performs
the following steps:
1) It computes its corresponding Lagrange compo-
nent, ci, based on (5), below.
2) It computes an auxiliary parameter ei =
gcin mod p.
3) It sends ei to every other IoT device.
4) It receives en(n 6= i) from each Dn,g(n 6= i).
5) It computes the key KDn,g based on (6), below.
ci =
N∑
l=1
dn,lfn,l
N∏
n=1,n 6=i
wn,l − xn
xi − xn
mod p (5)
where N , as mentioned before, is the number of Dn,g in
group g.
KDn,g =
N∏
n=1
en mod p (6)
C. Processing and storage overhead
The key generation and storage process, described
in the previous subsection, introduces very limited ad-
ditional processing and storage overhead. Assume that
the generation of a single key requires x CPU cycles
and the storage of a single key requires y storage units.
For example, in the network of Fig. 1 the processing
overhead for the server and the gateways GW1, GW2 is:
O
proc
S = 3x, O
proc
GW1
= 3x, OprocGW2 = 2x, respectively. Note
that by convention O
proc
Dn,g
= 0, since the end devices do
not generate any keys. Finally, the storage overhead for
every node is the space required to store a single key,
since each node needs to store only its own key. That is,
OstorS = O
stor
GWi
= OstorDn,g = y.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a high-level security anal-
ysis for the proposed scheme. Note that the scheme
primarily mitigates the node capture attack. Mitigation of
the replay attack is not intrinsic to the key generation and
reconstruction, but depends on how the elements of the
key are communicated to the involved parties.
A. Node capture attack
The proposed scheme is based on splitting the secret
key into parts in a manner that a minimum number of
parts is required to reconstruct the key. The split parts are
distributed among the group members. In particular, for a
group of N members, a secret key is split into N parts
so that at least K parts are required to reconstruct the
secret key. Anything less will not be able to reconstruct
the key. An attacker will therefore find it extremely hard
to obtain the secret key; this would require him/her to
know the number K and also to obtain at least K parts.
This means that the attacker must capture K out of the
N members. Hence, in our scheme, we can avoid storing
the whole secret key in the memory of the IoT device.
B. Replay attack
The replay attack refers to the strategy of capturing
packets from a specific node and analyzing them to
guess the secret key. Under our scheme, this type of
attack is also made harder, since only key fragments are
exchanged. In general, when talking about replay attacks,
two approaches can be considered. The first is the replay
of packets that exchange the key parts. Replaying these
packets does not serve any purpose other than a weak
attempt of a denial-of-service attack, since the packet
has to be received, processed and then discarded by the
receiver. The second approach refers to the replay of
data packets that are destined upstream. These packets
are encrypted and a replay will cause the packet to be
received processed and then discarded. Furthermore, ex-
changing time-stamped messages can act as an additional
security layer by ensuring that the messages are recent
and genuine. Finally, the use of nonces can enhance the
mitigation of replay attacks even more [24].
VIII. EVALUATION
A. Experimental setup
In this section, we evaluate our proposed scheme by
means of computer simulations. We use the Riverbed
Modeller 18 simulation tool [25]. Our considered network
consists of 10 groups. Each group has N = 230 group
members. In particular, the members of each group are 10
ZigBee Coordinators, 50 ZigBee Routers, and 170 ZigBee
End Devices. Configurations for the aforementioned node
types are available in the simulation tool. We generate
10 different mesh topologies and randomly assign nodes
into groups with a random key distribution hierarchy. In
the simulations, the hierarchy in each topology is static.
However, due to the generation of multiple topologies, this
approach represents closely enough a realistic dynamic
IoT scenario. In Fig. 2, we show an example of modelling
the key distribution within two groups using the Riverbed
Modeller.
Our aim is to study the impact of the node capture
attack on the security of the group communication of
Fig. 2. Modelling the key distribution hierarchy with the Riverbed
Modeller.
IoT devices. In particular, we determine the number of
compromised nodes when a subset of the nodes has been
captured by an attacker. That is, when the attacker has
captured one or more nodes, he/she can attack other nodes
of the group by exploiting the existing vulnerabilities of
the group communication scheme in use. In this study,
we compare our proposed secure group communications
scheme with the traditional public-key (PK) based authen-
tication.
We simulate different numbers of captured nodes as
follows: i) from 1 to 10 captured nodes to launch a low-
intensity node capture attack, and ii) from 10 to 100
captured nodes to launch a high-intensity node capture
attack. Afterwards, for each of the two approaches (the
PK-based and the proposed), we determine how many
nodes the attacker is able to compromise as a result of
the node capture attack. Our depicted results are mean
values across 10 different random network topologies and
group configurations.
B. Results
In Figs. 3 and 4, we present the number of com-
promised nodes versus the number of captured nodes
for the two approaches and for low and high intensity
attacks, respectively. For example, according to Fig. 3,
if the attacker is able to capture 4 nodes, then he/she
can compromise (on average) 30 nodes if our proposed
approach is used, and 80 nodes if the traditional PK-based
Fig. 3. The impact of a low-intensity node capture attack. The number
of compromised nodes in the traditional and in the proposed approaches.
Fig. 4. The impact of a high-intensity node capture attack. The number
of compromised nodes in the traditional and in the proposed approaches.
approach is used. The superiority of the proposed scheme
is even greater when the attack intensity increases. At the
same time, as shown in Fig. 4, the PK-based approach has
completely failed and a large number of network nodes
have been compromised when the number of captured
nodes is 100.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The IoT is the interconnection of networked and
intelligent objects to the Internet or Internet-like infras-
tructure. The things refer to physical objects, such as
home appliances, medical devices, and intelligent devices.
They are enhanced with computing and communication
technology and have the ability to interconnect and com-
municate through embedded RFID chips, barcodes, or
sensors. IoT has begun to form the basis of many critical
infrastructures, which are often nation-wide. Often these
infrastructures are deployed in remote and unattended
locations. Malicious users can physically access them
and can cause damage. The risks range from making the
devices non-functional to capturing the information within
them and re-programming them to behave maliciously.
In this paper we proposed a secure scheme for group
communication based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme.
The enhanced scheme can be used to enable secure group-
to-group communication of low-capability IoT devices
and to mitigate the negative effects of physical attacks,
such as node capture. We study the performance of our
scheme against node capture attacks. Our results show
that significant security improvements over the traditional
PK-based approache can be achieved.
In our future work, we plan to perform comparisons
with other proposed approaches for secure group com-
munication, focusing on resource-constrained IoT devices.
We are also going to quantitatively evaluate the required
storage overhead and take into consideration practical
storage and computational capabilities of modern IoT
devices. Finally, we plan to enhance our proposed scheme
so that protection against replay attacks is also supported.
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